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Latin America and the Caribbean has traditionally 
been an important supplier of energy and mineral 
resources. The region accounts for 13% of the world’s 
oil production and possesses 10% of world reserves, 
while Chile is the leading copper producer and exporter, 
accounting for an average of 35% of world output. For 
this reason, the recurrent fluctuations in the prices of 
these commodities have a significant impact on the 
economies of the countries specializing in them.
Among the many dilemmas raised by this situation, 
there are two main questions that have to be addressed 
by fiscal policymakers in boom periods. The first is how 
to transform windfall income into fiscal revenues, and 
the second is how to use the fiscal surpluses generated 
while avoiding the macroeconomic problems that such 
periods of high prices usually create.
Concerning the first question, the decision as to 
which tools to use will depend mainly on whether 
the non-renewables are publicly or privately owned. 
The most direct way of turning the exploitation of 
these commodities into fiscal revenue has been for 
governments to participate in their extraction through 
publicly-owned companies. When they are privately 
owned, fiscal revenues from these sectors are obtained 
through a combination of tax instruments covering 
the exploitation and marketing of the non-renewables 
concerned: royalties and taxes on income, profits and 
capital gains applied to the companies exploiting 
resources of this type. Furthermore, over the past few 
years, as prices have risen strongly, some countries 
have introduced new instruments: Chile established its 
special tax on operating income from mining activities 
and Bolivia approved its direct tax on hydrocarbons 
and their derivatives.
The second question concerns the role played 
by fiscal policy in stabilizing the economy. In this 
connection, it is often recommended that during 
economic boom periods the fiscal authorities should 
influence the level of activity by restricting public 
spending, whereas in periods of recession fiscal policy 
should contribute to the reactivation of the economy.
Accordingly, the usual recommendation is that 
fiscal policy be designed with this stabilizing function 
in mind. The goal of policy should be to decouple 
changes in revenue, which is strongly influenced by 
the economic cycle, from changes in spending. The 
countries in the region have sought responses of 
different kinds, ranging from discretionary fiscal policy 
decisions to more institutionalized mechanisms such as 
fiscal rules or stabilization funds.
In recent years, furthermore, coinciding with the 
upward trend in prices for mineral and energy goods 
and the consequent impact on fiscal revenues, the 
countries have been discussing different mechanisms 
for regulating the use of the resulting surpluses.
With these objectives in mind, this paper has been 
organized as follows. The next section analyses the 
importance of non-renewables in the region (section 
II). This is followed by consideration of changes in 
the prices of these commodities over the last few years 
and their impact on the terms of trade for countries 
specializing in them (section III). The performance 
of these countries is examined in relation to the main 
characteristics of fiscal policy in the region, and there 
is an analysis of developments in the public accounts in 
response to the price increases of recent years, stressing 
their impact and the policy decisions adopted (section 
IV). Lastly, section V contains a number of conclusions 
relating to the fiscal policy applied by these countries 
and their recent experience.
I
Introduction
…As was abundantly clear in the eighteenth century to those who pondered
the enigma of this gigantic empire dominated by one of the
most archaic nations in Europe, what had driven the
conquistadores was the search for precious metal…
Halperín Donghi (1990)
 The authors wish to express their appreciation for the comments 
of Omar Bello, Guillermo Cruces, Osvaldo Kacef and Ricardo 
Martner, as well as the observations of an anonymous referee on a 
preliminary version of the article. All opinions, errors or omissions, 
however, are the sole responsibility of the authors.
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Latin America has traditionally been a key supplier of 
commodities to the world. The earliest ECLAC works 
already refer to the region’s importance in this role.1 As 
figure 1 shows, commodities continue to account for a 
substantial proportion of the region’s total exports.
Despite the signif icant efforts made by the 
countries of the region to diversify exports over the last 
few years, one or two commodities continue to account 
for a major share of the export total in many of the 
countries. Table 1 shows commodities accounting for 
over 10% of each country’s exports in 2004.
The countries specializing in non-renewable 
exports (including energy and mineral goods, referred 
to hereafter as non-renewables) include, principally, 
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Bolivia, Chile, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico and Trinidad and Tobago. 
These countries can be classified into three groups by 
the average share of such products in their total exports 
(copper in Chile, hydrocarbons in Bolivia and Trinidad 
and Tobago, oil in the other countries) over the 1980-
2005 period (figure 2 and table 1):
• The first group includes the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago. For the 
II
The exploitation of non-renewables 
in the region
FIGURE 1
Latin America and the Caribbean: Commodity exports, 1986-2004
 (Percentages of total exports)
Source: ECLAC, using information from the Commodity Trade Database of the United Nations Statistics Division (COMTRADE).
1 In The Development of Latin America and its Principal Problems, 
we find the following assertion: “Under that schema the specific 
task that fell to Latin America, as part of the periphery of the world 
economic system, was that of producing food and raw materials for 
the great industrial centers.” (Prebisch, 1950).
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TABLE 1
Latin America and the Caribbean: Countries dependent
on a commodity export, 2004
(Percentages of each country’s total exports)
Commodity Over 50%  Between 20% and 49%  Between 10% and 19% 
 of total exports of total exports of total exports
Energy goods
Crude oil and oil products Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) Barbados (35.4%), 2003 Argentina (14.3%)
 (81.5%)  Colombia (25.2%)
 Ecuador (53.2%) Mexico (38.3%)a
  Trinidad and Tobago
  (38.5%), 2003
Natural gas  Bolivia (27.7%)
  Trinidad and Tobago
  (20.6%), 2003
Mineral goods
Bauxite and aluminium Jamaica (65.6%), 2002
Coal   Colombia (10.6%)
Copper  Chile (46.1%) Peru (19.6%)
Gold   Peru (18.6%)
Agricultural goods
Coffee   Guatemala (11.2%)
   Honduras (18.4%)
   Nicaragua (17.4%)
Bananas  Dominica (20.5%) Costa Rica (9.3%)
   Ecuador (13.2%)
   Honduras (11.3%)
   Panama (12.2%)
Soya   Paraguay (42.4%) Argentina (11.8%)
Fish   Panama (38.5%)
Crustaceans and molluscs   Belize (25.7%), 2003 Panama (14.6%)
Beef (cattle and meat)   Uruguay (20.6%)
  Nicaragua (20.1%)
Source: ECLAC, United Nations.
a Mexico’s export total does not include maquila exports.
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, oil accounted 
for an average of 79% of all exports each year 
over the period in question, and the figure was 
over 70% in all but three years (1981, 1982 and 
1998). For Trinidad and Tobago, hydrocarbon 
exports (oil and natural gas) averaged 66% of 
total exports each year.
• The second group includes Chile and Ecuador, 
whose copper and oil exports, respectively, 
averaged over 40% of total exports each year 
(40.9% for Chile and 45.6% for Ecuador).
• The third group includes Bolivia, Colombia and 
Mexico, where non-renewables accounted for 
between 20% and 35% of total exports.
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Prices for the commodities exported by Latin America 
and the Caribbean have increased significantly over 
the last few years. The largest increases have been for 
energy products, followed by metals and minerals.
According to ECLAC (2006) and as shown in figure 
3, both the overall commodities index and the energy 
and minerals indices are in an expansionary phase 
of the cycle and prices are higher than the trends of 
their respective series. The current cycle differs from 
previous ones in the magnitude and duration of the 
upswing.
In the energy products price index series (where 
crude oil has a 70% weighting) there have been sharp 
increases in the past two years (2004-2005). The 
increase in the price of oil has been due mainly to 
growth in the demand for crude (driven by China and 
India); in the case of metals, the price rise has been 
driven by the expansion of external demand, combined 
with low inventories.2
Where oil is concerned, there have been significant 
price fluctuations in the past few years (figure 4). After 
a period of sharp rises in the 1970s and the first half 
of the 1980s, prices remained relatively stable (with a 
jump in 1990-1991, during the Middle East conflict) 
until 1997. Volatility rose substantially from that year 
onward, with large increases in the past few years.
Copper prices have also shown a high degree of 
variability over the past 25 years, although less so than 
FIGURE 2
Latin America (seven countries): Exports of non-renewables 
from each country, 1980-2005a
(Percentages of each country’s total exports)
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures.
a  For the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador and Mexico, the figures are for oil exports. In the case of Bolivia and 
Trinidad and Tobago they are for hydrocarbon exports (except in the case of Bolivia for the 1980-1989 period, when they are for natural 
gas only). In the case of Chile they are for copper and molybdenum exports.
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Commodity price developments
2 See ECLAC (2006) and Ovalle (2006) for further details.
C E P A L  R E V I E W  9 0  •  D E C E M B E R  2 0 0 664
FISCAL POLICY AND THE COMMODITIES BOOM: THE IMPACT OF HIGHER PRICES FOR NON-RENEWABLES IN LATIN
AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN  •  JUAN PABLO JIMÉNEZ AND VARINIA TROMBEN
FIGURE 3
Latin America and the Caribbean: Price indices, series, trends and cyclical 
components, 1970-2005
(2000 = 100)
 Commodity price index Commodity price index
 Series and trend Cyclical component
 Energy price index Energy price index
 Series and trend Cyclical component
 Minerals and metals price index Minerals and metals price index
 Series and trend Cyclical component
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures.
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oil prices.3 Since Chile is the world’s leading copper 
producer and exporter (generating on average 35% 
of world output of mined copper), its mining policy 
has a direct impact on the price of this commodity 
in the international market. Copper production and 
investment in Chile increased sharply during the 1990s 
and the consequent overproduction seems to have 
been responsible for a large drop in the international 
market price. Since 2002, the copper price, like the oil 
price, has resumed an upward trend, mainly because of 
growing demand from the large Asian economies.4
The significant price increases for the products 
in which the region specializes have brought a strong 
improvement in the terms of trade. The high share 
of non-renewables in total exports means that the 
region’s terms of trade are closely linked to the export 
commodities price index. According to ECLAC (2006), 
there is a statistically significant correlation between 
these two variables, averaging 0.65 since the early 
1990s. Nevertheless, as figure 5 shows, the process 
differs greatly between countries.
The countries that showed the most pronounced 
improvement in their terms of trade over the 2003-
2005 period are the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
Ecuador, Chile and Colombia. In the cases of the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Ecuador and 
FIGURE 4
Copper, natural gas and oil prices, 1980-2005
(Cents per pound for copper, dollars per million British thermal 
units for natural gas and dollars per barrel for oil)
 Copper Oil
 Natural gas
Source: World Bank.
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3 Jiménez and Tromben (2006) show that the coefficient of variation 
was lower for copper than for oil and gas in 1957-2005.
4 See Kaplinsky (2005) for further details on the entry of the 
People’s Republic of China into the global market and its impact 
on the demand for non-renewables. According to Kaplinsky, it is 
possible to identify three trends that are having a significant impact 
on developments in the region’s terms of trade: (i) it is not inevitable 
that prices of “soft commodities” will fall; (ii) there are now doubts 
as to whether the prices of manufactures will actually continue to 
increase, especially those in which China is involved; (iii) the prices 
of many “hard commodities”, which were in a quite profound long-
term decline, have been rising since the early 2000s.
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Colombia, this improvement reflects high oil prices. 
In the case of Chile, an oil-importing country, higher 
copper prices more than compensated for the increase 
in oil prices.
Over the last few years, the large Asian economies’ 
growing share of world trade has tended to alter the 
structure of global demand, skewing it more towards 
raw materials and certain manufactures, while at the 
same time considerably expanding the supply of a 
wide range of manufactured products. As a result, the 
region’s terms of trade have recovered from the decline 
of the 1980s and have exhibited a generally positive, 
albeit volatile, trend since the 1960s.5 The new structure 
of world goods supply and demand could give rise to 
long-term changes in price trends for commodities and 
basic manufactures, and this ought to be taken into 
account when fiscal instruments are designed.
5 See ECLAC (2005a and 2005b).
FIGURE 5
Latin America: Terms of trade, 2003, 2004 and 2005
(Percentage variation) 
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures.
a Preliminary figures.
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To consider the fiscal policy implemented by the 
countries analysed here, this section will be divided 
into two parts. The first will analyse the behaviour of 
these countries in relation to the most salient features of 
fiscal policy in Latin America. The second will examine 
how these countries in particular have coped with the 
price surge of the past few years, emphasizing two of 
the main issues for fiscal policy: how governments 
manage to capture resources from non-renewables and, 
most importantly, how higher commodity prices have 
impacted fiscal revenues. It will then go on to analyse 
how governments have managed this plenty so as to 
attenuate its impact on spending.
In countries whose production structure is 
dominated by non-renewables, the usual challenges 
facing fiscal policy are compounded by the intrinsic 
characteristics of these commodities. The volatility 
and unpredictability of their prices can complicate 
f iscal policy, making it diff icult to determine an 
appropriate and sustainable level of public spending.6 
In addition, the fact that natural resource reserves are 
finite means that fiscal policy design has to provide for 
considerations of intergenerational equity.7
1. Solvency, volatility and the cycle
Any attempt to describe fiscal policy in Latin American 
and Caribbean countries needs to highlight three 
characteristics: solvency problems, volatility and 
procyclical behaviour. Solvency problems are related to 
the difficulty experienced by the region’s governments 
in financing goods and services provided by their 
public sectors in a sustainable way. As an illustration 
of this point, only 48 of the 304 overall fiscal balances 
observed from 1990 to 2005 for the 19 countries in 
the ECLAC database were positive. If these indicators 
are disaggregated by decade, the 1990-1994 period 
included 29 positive overall fiscal balances, as against 
just nine between 1995 and 1999 and 10 between 2002 
and 2005 (there was not a single positive fiscal result 
in either 2000 or 2001). Extending the time coverage 
to 1950-20058 (figure 6), only 181 of 976 observations 
show overall fiscal surpluses, which is less than 20% 
of the total.
Dividing the results between countries specializing 
in non-renewables and the rest of the region’s countries 
shows that the former have tended to run lower deficits 
than the latter. Over the 1950-2005 period, countries 
specializing in non-renewables recorded an average 
overall fiscal deficit of 1.74% of gross domestic product 
(GDP), while the average for the remainder was 2.75% 
of GDP. As figure 7 shows, the years of high oil prices 
account for most of the difference in fiscal results 
between the two groups.
Another striking feature of fiscal policy in the 
countries of the region has been its high level of 
volatility. The fiscal results of Latin America and the 
Caribbean have been much more variable than those 
of the countries in the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), whether 
measured as a percentage of GDP, as a share of 
total fiscal resources or in relation to the size of the 
domestic financial system (Gavin, Hausmann and 
others, 1996; Alesina and Tabellini, 2005). This high 
volatility is a feature both of overall fiscal balances 
and of revenues and expenditure separately (Jiménez 
and Tromben, 2006).
The fiscal revenues of the countries specializing 
in non-renewables can be broken down into revenue 
from the exploitation of non-renewables and revenue 
IV
Fiscal policy in countries that 
export non-renewables
6 Rigobón (2006) lists the typical responses of fiscal policy to 
volatility and uncertainty in fiscal revenues: (i) privatization of the 
source of volatility; (ii) the use of financial markets to transfer risk; 
and (iii) self-insurance, basically through the use of contingency 
funds.
7 See Jiménez and Tromben (2006) for further details on the special 
features of fiscal policy in countries of this type.
8 This series was compiled using the Oxford Latin American 
Economic History Database (OXLAD) of the University of Oxford 
for the 1950-1989 period, and the ECLAC database, developed by the 
Latin American Institute for Economic and Social Planning (ILPES), 
for the 1990-2005 period.
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FIGURE 6
Latin America and the Caribbean: Fiscal revenue and expenditure, 1950-2005
(Percentages of gross domestic product)
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of the OXLAD and ILPES databases. The values are simple averages for central government.
FIGURE 7
Latin America and the Caribbean: Fiscal balances for countries specializing 
in non-renewables and for all other countries in the region, 1950-2005
(Percentages of gross domestic product)
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of the OXLAD and ilpes databases. The values are simple averages for central government.
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from other sources. As table 2 shows, revenue generated 
by non-renewables fluctuates much more than total 
revenue. In the case of the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela, the high volatility of total fiscal revenue can 
be attributed to both oil revenues and other revenues. 
In the case of Chile, although income from copper is 
highly volatile, the greater stability of other revenues 
(together with the lower share of non-renewables in the 
total) means that total revenue has fluctuated by less 
than the average for the region.
The more diversified the fiscal revenue structure, the 
more the volatility of a country’s tax base is neutralized. 
The variability of revenue is largely determined by the 
share of resources from non-renewables in the total.
It is not only fiscal revenue that has been volatile 
in the region. Over the 1990-2004 period, primary 
expenditure (which excludes debt interest payments) 
was more volatile on average than revenue (Jiménez 
and Tromben, 2006). This is surprising, since income 
might be expected to be more volatile than spending, 
as in the OECD countries (Gavin, Hausmann and others, 
1996).9
This surprisingly high degree of volatility is 
associated with the third feature of fiscal policy in 
the region: its relation to the economic cycle. Several 
papers have demonstrated that the fiscal policy of Latin 
America and the Caribbean has behaved in a way which 
can be described as procyclical,10 especially as public 
spending has expanded in upturns and declined during 
recessions, while public accounts in the OECD countries 
have shown the opposite tendency.
There are different ways of evaluating the 
relationship between fiscal policy and the cycle. To 
test the behaviour of the countries under consideration 
compared to the rest of the region, two procedures will 
be followed.
Firstly, following the methodology set out in 
Martner and Tromben (2003), a graphic analysis 
will be carried out to identify episodes in the GDP 
cycle of each country and to observe the resulting 
fiscal position of 18 countries in the region over the 
TABLE 2
Latin American countries specializing in non-renewables: 
Coefficient of variation in fiscal revenue, 1990-2005
(Percentages)
 Variation coefficient (%) Revenue from
  non-renewables as share
 Total revenue Revenue from Other revenue of total fiscal revenue (%)
  non-renewables   
Bolivia 10.6 24.7 16.9 25.3
Chile 5.9 77.2 4.4 7.4
Colombia 16.9 38.3 15.7 11.3
Ecuador 10.7 26.4 11.3 30.0
Mexico 7.5 12.5 11.5 30.9
Venezuela 16.6 33.2 35.0 55.2
    
Average NR countries 11.4 35.4 15.8 26.7
Average non-NR countries 9.2
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of ECLAC data.
9 This volatility might be justified if it were the result of countercyclical 
movements that offset and stabilized macroeconomic shocks affecting 
fiscal income. The empirical evidence suggests the contrary, however: 
primary spending in the region has been procyclical, amplifying 
rather than absorbing exogenous shocks (Alesina and Tabellini, 
2005).
10 Gavin and Perotti (1997) have argued that fiscal policy in Latin 
America is procyclical, while Talvi and Vegh (2000), Catão and 
Sutton (2002), Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh (2004) and Alesina 
and Tabellini (2005) have pointed out that this phenomenon is not 
exclusive to Latin America: procyclical fiscal policy is common to 
many developing countries. In Martner and Tromben (2003), analysis 
of 45 fiscal episodes (showing changes in the cyclically adjusted 
overall balance) between 1990 and 2001 shows that fiscal policy was 
procyclical in 25 of them and countercyclical in just eight.
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1980-2005 period. Two variables are needed for this 
purpose: the GDP gap11 and the change in the cyclically 
adjusted balance.12 In figure 8, each point represents an 
economic cycle with its corresponding fiscal position. 
More specifically, what is observed is the average GDP 
gap over an economic cycle in a particular country 
on the horizontal axis, and the average change in the 
cyclically adjusted balance over the same period on 
the vertical axis. The chart can be read as follows: 
the upper left-hand quadrant and the lower right-hand 
quadrant indicate procyclical fiscal positions, the other 
two quadrants indicate countercyclical fiscal positions, 
and points close to the horizontal axis indicate fiscal 
episodes that are neutral in relation to the economic 
cycle. The great majority of cycles and fiscal episodes 
are in the two quadrants corresponding to procyclical 
positions (66% of the total). The countries which have 
had more than one countercyclical or neutral episode 
(12% and 22% of the total, respectively) are Chile, 
Guatemala, Mexico and Panama.
The same methodology will be used in figure 
9, differentiating the countries by their specialization 
or non-specialization in non-renewables for a more 
recent period (1990-2005). The upper boxes show the 
change in the cyclically adjusted balance, while the 
lower ones show changes in the cyclically adjusted 
primary balance. What this first analysis reveals is that 
countries dependent on non-renewables also display 
mainly procyclical behaviour (47% of the total), but 
with a greater number of neutral cases (35% of the 
total) than the other countries of the region.
FIGURE 8
Latin America and the Caribbean: Economic cycle and fiscal position, 1980-2005
(Percentages of gross domestic product)
Source: Prepared by the authors.
a Cyclically adjusted balance.
11 The GDP gap is calculated using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. What 
is analysed here are cycles rather than individual years. A negative 
cycle is defined as a period in which actual GDP is less than trend 
GDP (that is, the GDP gap is negative), while a positive cycle is 
defined as a period in which actual GDP is higher than trend GDP 
(that is, the GDP gap is positive).
12 The change in the cyclically adjusted balance (BCA) is calculated 
as follows:
BCA = BCAt -
 BCAt-1,
where BCA = BActual - B
Cyclical
BCyclical = (Tax Revenues * GDP Gap),
which assumes that the elasticity of tax revenues is 1 and that non-
tax revenues and public spending are not included in the cyclical 
balance.
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The second way of evaluating the relationship 
between fiscal policy and the economic cycle is to use 
econometric estimates. Because consistent historical 
series are not available, this will be done by arriving 
at an estimate for three separate panels of data: first, 
Latin America and the Caribbean as a whole; second, 
countries specializing in non-renewables (NR); third, 
all other countries (non-NR).
The regression is specified as follows:
Δ(balanceit) = α+βGDPgapit + δ(balanceit-1) + γTDIit + εit
The specification of β matches the measurement 
of the relationship between the cycle and fiscal policy 
calculated by Alesina and Tabellini (2005). The three 
explanatory variables are: the GDP gap (the difference 
in logarithmic terms between GDP and its trend value 
as measured by the Hodrick-Prescott filter), a fiscal 
balance lag, and the terms of trade (measured as the 
gap from the trend value, using the Hodrick-Prescott 
filter). A negative β coefficient indicates that a positive 
shock in the economy (that is, a positive GDP gap) is 
associated with a deterioration in the fiscal balance, 
so that fiscal policy is procyclical. The opposite is the 
case when the β coefficient is positive. The results of 
the estimates are shown in table 3.
Using this specification, negative signs are found for 
the three data panels, which again indicates procyclical 
fiscal behaviour in the countries of the region, whether 
or not they are dependent on non-renewables.
FIGURE 9
Latin America and the Caribbean: Economic cycle and 
fiscal position by groups of countries,a 1990-2005
(Percentages of gross domestic product)
 Non-NR countries NR countries
Source: Prepared by the authors.
a  Countries not specializing in non-renewables (non-NR) and countries specializing in non-renewables (NR).
b  CAOB = cyclically adjusted overall balance.
c  CAPB = cyclically adjusted primary balance.
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2. Fiscal policy and commodity prices
In recent years, the particular situation faced by the 
fiscal authorities of these countries because of their 
specialization in volatile and finite commodities has 
been further complicated by the debate on the correct 
stance for fiscal policy at times when rising prices 
cause a surge in revenues. Of the many questions raised 
by this state of affairs for fiscal policymakers in such 
countries, two stand out in particular. First, what is the 
best way of transforming revenues from higher prices 
into fiscal resources? And second, what is the right 
mechanism or approach for using these fiscal surpluses 
without triggering the macroeconomic problems usually 
associated with such boom periods?
The first question concerns the way governments 
capture resources from the exploitation of non-
renewable resources. As stated earlier (figure 9), the 
evolution and relative scale of these resources differ 
from country to country. In Chile, the average fiscal 
resources generated by copper exploitation each year 
during 1990-2005 represented less than 10% of total 
revenue, while resources deriving from oil represented 
about 11% of the total in Colombia, 25% in Bolivia, 
30% in Trinidad and Tobago, about 40% in Ecuador 
and Mexico, and over 50% in the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela.
The differing composition of the revenue structure 
in these countries is due to the various instruments used 
to tax the sectors concerned and the relative weight 
of non-renewables. The strategic importance of these 
sectors to the economies concerned, combined with 
the rise in prices over recent years, has made them 
a central target for the tax policies of the countries’ 
governments, which have devised a variety of revenue-
raising mechanisms.
Obviously the choice of instrument will vary 
depending on whether the resources are publicly 
or privately owned. The most direct way of turning 
revenue from these products into fiscal resources has 
been for governments to become directly involved in 
production through State-owned enterprises.
Given that these resources are largely exploited 
by the private sector, countries have designed different 
mechanisms and specific taxes to appropriate some of 
the income generated.13 These usually take the form of: 
TABLE 3
Latin America: Fiscal policy and economic cycle, by groups of countries 
(Estimates)a
 Latin America Countries specializing  Countries not specializing
  in non-renewables in non-renewables
GDP gap -0.07 -0.14 -0.08
   [-2.17]b  [-2.94]b -[1.89]c
S (-1) -0.36 -0.29 -0.46
   (-9.14)d  (-4.81)d  (-7.14)d
Terms of trade 0.04 0.08 0.01
   (-2.81)b  (4.03)d (-0.72)
No. of observations 397 133 224
R2 0.21 0.29 0.25
Source: Prepared by the authors. 
a Data panel estimates with fixed effects by country. The values in parentheses are t statistics. The sample is from the 1980-2005 period.
b Denotes significance at 5% level. 
c Denotes significance at 10% level.
d Denotes significance at 1% level.
13 Although the subject will not be dealt with in this article, it is 
also very important to determine the institutional arrangements 
for distributing these resources between the different levels of 
government. Ahmad and Mottu (2002) classify the allocation 
of oil revenues as totally centralized; totally decentralized; with 
separation by tax source; and with revenue-sharing. In the four 
countries of the region considered in their paper (the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador and Mexico), subnational 
governments share in oil revenues. According to ESMAP (2005), 
there has been a marked tendency towards decentralization of 
these resources. In Bolivia, Colombia and Ecuador, the central 
government’s share of these revenues fell from 77%, 43% and 100%, 
respectively, in 1997/1998 to 68%, 30% and 97% in 2000/2002.
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FIGURE 10
Latin America (seven countries): Share of non-renewables 
in each country’s total fiscal revenue
(Percentages of total fiscal revenue)
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures. The figures for Bolivia cover general government; those for Chile, Colombia and the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela cover central government; for the other countries, they cover the non-financial public sector.
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TABLE 4
Latin America (seven countries): Characteristics of tax regimes for non-renewables
 Country and Royalties  Revenue tax  Profits tax  Other taxes Public
 commodity (rates) (rates) (rates)  participation
Bolivia  National royalties: 6% Direct Company profits tax Special tax on Yesa
(hydrocarbons) Departmental hydrocarbons tax (IUE) of 25% and 12.5% hydrocarbons and
 royalties: 12% (IDH): 32% on for remittances abroad derivatives Marketing
 Share of National hydrocarbon Excess profits surtax tax Special tax
 Treasury: 6% production of 25% (fixed margin)
Chile   Revenue tax, Additional tax on Special tax on Yes
(copper)  first category: 17% interest remittances: 35% operating income
   For public enterprises: from mining
   special 40% profits tax activity
Colombia (oil) 8-25% 35% 7% Transport Pipelines Yes
Ecuador (oil)  12.5-18.5% 25% 25%  Yes
Mexico (oil)  35% 7.7% Special tax on Yes
    production and 
    services (IEPS)
Trinidad and Tobago 10% on onshore  Oil profits tax: 35-42%
(oil)  sales and 12.5%   on profits from oil
 on offshore sales  production
 Additional tax on   Unemployment tax: 5%
 sales of crude oil   of profits from oil
 (rate varies with  production
 the oil price)
Venezuela (B.R.) 30% Oil revenue tax No  Yes
(oil)  (ISLR): 50%
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of legislation in the countries.
a Supreme Decree of 1 May 2006: nationalization of hydrocarbons.
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royalties (generally based on output to ensure at least a 
minimum payment for mineral resources), an income 
tax (often with differentiated tax rates) and profits 
taxes applicable to companies exploiting non-renewable 
resources. Table 4 summarizes some of the revenue-
raising instruments used by countries in the region.
This group of taxes has allowed fiscal revenues 
from these sectors to reflect changes in the prices of 
the commodities concerned (figure 11).
The large rise in prices between 2002 and 
2005, combined with the introduction of new tax-
raising measures in 2005, has generated a significant 
increase in these countries’ fiscal resources. As will be 
discussed below, the authorities have taken advantage 
of the price surge to apply new taxes to sectors that 
produce minerals and energy products, making their 
tax structures even more specialized. Of the seven 
countries included in figure 12, four have increased 
their fiscal revenues by more than 3% of GDP: Bolivia 
(6.7%), Chile (3.3%), Trinidad and Tobago (8.9%) and 
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (6.4%).
The large rise in f iscal revenues from non-
renewables has brought the tax burden on the sectors 
concerned to levels comparable with the highest in the 
series. This burden has not, however, been matched by 
a similar rise in spending (figure 13).
In Bolivia, the improvement in fiscal revenues took 
place mainly in 2005, being chiefly due to the approval 
of the direct tax on hydrocarbons and derivatives (IDH), 
which yielded receipts equivalent to 3.1% of GDP that 
FIGURE 11
Latin America and the Caribbean (six countries): Prices of non-renewables 
and fiscal revenues raised from them
 Copper price and fiscal revenue from copper (Chile) Oil price and fiscal revenue from oil
 (Cents per pound and % of GDP) (Dollars per barrel and % of GDP)
Natural gas price and revenue from hydrocarbons (Bolivia)
(Dollars per million BTUa and % of GDP)
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of official country data.
a  BTU: British thermal unit.
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
C
en
ts
 p
er
 p
ou
nd
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
%
 o
f 
 G
D
P
Copper price Fiscal revenue from copper
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
D
ol
la
rs
 p
er
 b
ar
re
l
0
5
10
15
20
%
 o
f 
G
D
P
Oil price Ecuador
Mexico Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of)
Trinidad and Tobago
0
2
4
6
8
10
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
D
ol
la
rs
 p
er
 m
il
li
on
 B
T
U
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
%
 o
f 
 G
D
P
Natural gas price Fiscal revenue from hydrocarbons
C E P A L  R E V I E W  9 0  •  D E C E M B E R  2 0 0 6 75
FISCAL POLICY AND THE COMMODITIES BOOM: THE IMPACT OF HIGHER PRICES FOR NON-RENEWABLES IN LATIN
AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN  •  JUAN PABLO JIMÉNEZ AND VARINIA TROMBEN
FIGURE 12
Latin America and the Caribbean (seven countries): Variation 
in fiscal revenues between 2002 and 2005
(Percentages of gross domestic product)
Source: Prepared by the authors from ECLAC-ILPES data.
FIGURE 13
Latin America and the Caribbean (seven countries): Variation 
in public spending between 2002 and 2005
(Percentages of gross domestic product)
Source: Prepared by the authors from ECLAC-ILPES data.
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year, and the surtax on the excess profits of extraction 
companies (which was decreed in 1994 but collected 
for the first time in 2005). This has not necessarily 
led to central government accounts improving in the 
same proportion, since the hydrocarbons tax is shared 
out between the national treasury (42.34% of receipts) 
and the departments (57.7%). Where expenditure is 
concerned, the drop in current outlays is the result of 
austerity programmes implemented in recent years.
In Chile, increased activity and higher prices for 
copper and molybdenum, together with legal changes 
in the taxation of the mining sector (the special tax 
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16 In the region’s more decentralized countries, such as Argentina, 
Brazil and Colombia, one of the main objectives of the rules was to 
coordinate fiscal policy (expenditure, deficit and borrowing) among 
the various levels of government.
14 As in other countries, oil sector taxation in Trinidad and 
Tobago distinguishes between exploration, production, refining 
and marketing. For the extraction and production stages, the 
government collects revenues using the following instruments: 
royalties (rates of 10% and 12.5%), a levy on oil production and 
a small petroleum tax (used to finance the regulatory activities of 
the Ministry of Energy). Income taxes are as follows: the oil profits 
tax, with a top rate of 35% for oil extracted onshore and 42% for 
oil extracted offshore; an unemployment tax of 5% of profits; and 
a surtax on sales of crude whose rate varies with the oil price.
15 Companies in the gas sector pay royalties at a rate negotiated with 
the government. Where revenue taxes are concerned, companies pay 
the normal profits tax (35%) and a small petroleum tax.
on operating revenues from mining activity was 
introduced in 2005), have resulted in a large increase 
in fiscal revenues. The countercyclical orientation of 
fiscal policy (discussed in more detail below) indicates 
a structural surplus of 1% of GDP, which means that 
expenditure has grown by less than GDP, significantly 
improving the fiscal result.
In Ecuador, the strong improvement in the 
country’s terms of trade has not been fully reflected 
in fiscal revenues. The rise in oil prices has affected 
Ecuador’s public budget in different ways. On the one 
hand, higher prices have swelled resources thanks to 
specific taxes and income from the State oil company 
(PETROECUADOR). On the other hand, higher oil costs 
have affected the public accounts because domestic 
prices for petroleum derivatives have been frozen since 
2003 and much of the demand for derivatives is met from 
imports (paid for at international prices). As a result, 
public revenues from domestic sales of derivatives fell 
by 1.8% of GDP between 2003 and 2005.
In Trinidad and Tobago, fiscal policy in recent 
years has been aimed at maximizing tax receipts from 
the energy sector (thereby relieving fiscal pressure on 
the non-energy sector) by means of a complex tax 
regime in which the oil sector14 is treated differently 
from the gas sector.15 Growth in the country’s gas sector 
was behind the government’s decision to carry out a 
tax reform in the energy sector as a whole, announced 
for the 2005/2006 financial year. The substantial rise 
in revenues has enabled the authorities to raise current 
and capital expenditure and increase contributions to 
the Interim Revenue Stabilization Fund (IRSF), which 
will be analysed below.
In recent years, the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela has made numerous reforms to its tax 
structure: reduction of the value added tax (VAT) rate 
and abolition of the corporate assets tax in 2004; 
increase in the royalties and tax on oil sector revenues 
in 2005; the creation of a new tax on crude extraction 
(extraction tax), which has been announced but not yet 
implemented; and suspension of the bank withdrawals 
tax in early 2006. Increased fiscal resources have 
enabled the authorities to implement an expansionary 
spending policy, mainly through the country’s Fund 
for Economic and Social Development (FONDESPA), 
whose revenue comes from the oil sales of Petróleos 
de Venezuela (PDVSA), which do not appear in central 
government data.
The positive fiscal results are one of the factors 
that have enabled these countries to reduce public 
debt as a proportion of GDP. Between 2003 and 2005, 
Bolivia reduced its debt by 10.4% of GDP, Chile by 
5.6%, Colombia by 3.8%, Ecuador by 2.7%, Mexico 
by 1.9% and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela by 
12.2% (ECLAC, 2006). Except in the case of Bolivia, 
much of this reduction was due to primary surpluses 
in the 2002-2005 period. This ties in with another issue 
that becomes important during periods of high prices: 
how best to use fiscal surpluses and how to avoid the 
macroeconomic problems associated with such periods 
of plenty.
Thus, the situation gives rise to two problems 
that cannot always be resolved simultaneously. One 
is that of stabilizing expenditure by decoupling it 
from the increase in resources and thus turning this 
increase into a fiscal surplus, and the other is that of 
dealing appropriately with this fiscal surplus and the 
resulting assets.
The first problem is related to the role fiscal 
policy ought to play in stabilizing the economy. The 
region’s countries have looked for different ways of 
complying with the basic recommendation usually 
made in economic boom periods, which is to moderate 
activity by restricting public spending. In recent years, 
discretionary fiscal policy has accordingly been less 
expansionary, as described in previous paragraphs, and 
new fiscal rules have been introduced.
Countries in the region have been making extensive 
use of fiscal rules since the second half of the 1990s. 
While the initial aim of these rules was to improve the 
solvency of the public accounts,16 in some cases they 
have also successfully separated the growth of resources 
from patterns of expenditure (table 5).
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TABLE 5
Latin America and the Caribbean: Fiscal rules currently in force
 Country Implementation Coverage Type Additional rules Legal 
  date    status
Balance rule Argentina 2004 Federal and Nominal growth of  Law
   subnational primary expenditure 
    must not exceed 
    nominal GDP growth
 Brazil 2001 Federal and Current equilibrium Limits on wage Law
   subnational (subnational); primary expenditure
    surplus (federal) (percentage of total)
 Chile 2006 Central Overall structural Pension Reserve Law
    surplus (1% of GDP) Fund (FRP)
     Economic and Social 
     Stabilization Fund (FEES)
 Colombia 2001 Subnational Current equilibrium National Coffee Fund Law
   governments  (FNC)
     Petroleum Saving and 
     Stabilization Fund (FAEP) 
 Ecuador 2005 Federal and Real growth of current Oil Stabilization Fund Law
   subnational expenditure must not (FEP)
    exceed 3.5% Saving and 
     Contingency Fund (FAC)
 Mexico 2006 Federal and Current equilibrium Oil Revenues Law
   subnational  Stabilization Fund (FEIP) 
 Peru 2003 National Deficit below 1% of Fiscal Stabilization Law
    GDP; real growth of Fund
    primary expenditure no 
    more than 3% per year
 Venezuela 2000 National Current equilibrium Macroeconomic Law
 (Bol. Rep. of)    Stabilization Fund (FEM)
Debt rule Argentina 2004 Subnational Annual borrowing  Law
   governments limits to ensure that 
    debtservicing does 
    notexceed 15% of 
    current resources
 Brazil 2001 Subnational Annual borrowing limits  Law
   governments
 Colombia 1997 Subnational Borrowing limits  Law
   governments determined by solvency 
    and liquidity indicators
 Ecuador 2005 Federal and Timetable for reducing Borrowing limits for Law
   subnational debt to 40% of GDP subnational governments 
     (outstanding debt, flow 
     and guarantees)
Source: Prepared by the authors using data from ILPES (2004), Kopits (2004) and official sources.
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17 For more detail, see Almeida, Gallardo and Tomaselli (2006).
18 Concerning the potential and implementation difficulties of such 
rules in Chile, see Marcel, Tokman and others (2001), Tapia (2003) 
and LeFort (2006).
19 See Jiménez and Tromben (2006) for an exhaustive analysis of 
these funds in Latin America.
These fiscal rules have taken a variety of forms, 
ranging from quantitative limits on outstanding 
debt, expenditure and borrowing to the creation of 
contingency or stabilization funds.
To improve fiscal sustainability, Ecuador adopted 
the Organic Law on Fiscal Responsibility, Stability and 
Transparency (passed in 2002 and amended in 2005), 
which limits current expenditure increases to 3.5% in 
real terms.17
In Chile, since 2001 the authorities have applied 
a f iscal policy rule requiring a structural surplus 
equivalent to 1% of GDP.18 The central government 
structural balance reflects the budgetary result that 
would be obtained each year if output followed its 
trend and the prices of copper and molybdenum were as 
projected. The aim is to adjust the overall fiscal balance 
by isolating it from the revenue effects of fluctuations 
in GDP and in copper and molybdenum prices. Two 
variables have to be estimated for this purpose: the 
long-term copper price and the trend growth rate of 
GDP. Both variables are estimated by a committee of 
experts while the budget is in preparation.
Other mechanisms that have become particularly 
important in the region include contingency funds 
associated with the exploitation of non-renewable 
resources.19 They are usually classif ied as either 
stabilization funds or saving funds, depending on what 
their basic objective is. Stabilization funds seek to 
cushion the impact of revenue fluctuations on public 
spending, while saving funds seek to create reserves 
of wealth for future generations so that they may 
benefit to some degree from the resources generated 
by exploiting deposits of finite commodities; in other 
words, they aim to put aside a sum of assets so that 
those generations have the enjoyment of part of what 
is extracted in the present. As Jiménez and Tromben 
(2006) have pointed out, however, funds set up in recent 
years have been governed more by stabilization than 
by saving criteria.
Although there are some very old stabilization 
funds in the region (the Coffee Fund in Colombia 
dates from 1940), there has been a new drive to create 
such mechanisms in the last few years: in Chile, the 
Copper Compensation Fund (FCC) was set up in 1985, 
activated in 1987 and replaced by the Economic and 
Social Stabilization Fund in 2006; in Colombia, the 
Petroleum Saving and Stabilization Fund (FAEP) was 
set up in 1995; in Ecuador, the Fund for Stabilization, 
Social Investment and Public Debt Reduction (FEIREP) 
was set up in 2002 and replaced by the Saving 
and Contingency Fund in 2005; in Mexico, the Oil 
Revenues Stabilization Fund (FEIP) was established in 
2000; and in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, the 
Macroeconomic Stabilization Fund (FEM) was created 
in 2004 to replace the former Investment Fund for 
Macroeconomic Stabilization (FIEM) set up in 1998.
As table 6 shows, these funds have various aims 
and have undergone numerous changes since they were 
first created. Among the main differences in their design 
are: (i) the reference variable: in Chile, a committee 
of experts decides what the base price will be each 
year; in Ecuador, the Fund for Stabilization, Social 
Investment and Public Debt Reduction (FEIREP) uses 
two reference prices; in Mexico, the reference price is 
the one included in the federal revenues law; and in 
Colombia and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
fluctuations in fiscal revenues are taken as the reference 
rather than any price; and (ii) the existence or absence 
of budget precommitments, which will be explained 
in more detail below. Common characteristics shared 
by the funds include the fact that all have saving rules 
for revenues above the reference value of the target 
variable, rather than a spending limit.
The various funds have differed in their performance. 
In Chile, the behaviour of the Copper Compensation 
Fund (FCC) has varied in different periods. Between 
1987 and 1991, very high copper prices resulted in 
growing contributions to the fund, while withdrawals 
almost matched contributions, meaning that the 
authorities used the resources available. The Oil Price 
Stabilization Fund (FEPP) was set up in those years.20 
In 1992-1997 the authorities did not use the resources 
accumulated in the FCC, even though copper prices 
were extremely volatile. From 1998 to 2003, the 
copper price plummeted and contributions to the fund 
diminished. In 2000 and 2003 they were zero, although 
they picked up again in 2004 and 2005.
20 The Oil Price Stabilization Fund (FEPP) is a mechanism that 
determines the percentage of price increases for imported crude 
that is to be passed on to the public. Its aim is to maintain a degree 
of price stability for petroleum derivatives in the Chilean domestic 
market. It was created in January 1991 (Law 19.030) with an initial 
US$ 200 million lent by the Copper Compensation Fund.
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In Colombia, the Petroleum Saving and Stabilization 
Fund (FAEP) began operating in 1995. Some authors 
argue that although the fund did not achieve the 
objective of increasing fiscal and macroeconomic 
stability, it did serve to curb the expenditure of territorial 
entities (departments and municipalities) that receive 
oil revenues.
In Mexico, although the Oil Revenues Stabilization 
Fund (FEIP) was set up too recently for conclusions to 
be drawn, the amounts accumulated have been small 
in relation to total resources, suggesting that it has a 
limited capacity for stabilization.
In the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, the 
Investment Fund for Macroeconomic Stabilization (FIEM) 
set up in 1998 (and replaced by the Macroeconomic 
Stabilization Fund in 2004) is one of the funds to 
have accumulated the most resources (5.3% of GDP 
in 2001). It should, however, be pointed out that its 
operating rules have been amended several times and 
its resources have been used for purposes other than 
those originally stipulated.
In Trinidad and Tobago, the Interim Revenue 
Stabilization Fund (IRSF) was set up in 2000 to save 
the surplus fiscal revenues generated by the difference 
between the reference oil price used to calculate 
revenue and the actual oil price. Unlike other funds 
in the region, the IRSF was created by the budget 
act for fiscal year 2000/2001. However, there is no 
law establishing its operating rules (withdrawal and 
deposit laws, fund management). Despite this, it is 
the fund that has accumulated the most resources as 
a proportion of GDP (see below). The budget act for 
the 2005/2006 fiscal year provides for the fund to be 
transformed (by law) into a Heritage Stabilization Fund 
with three components: stabilization, heritage for future 
generations, and investment and infrastructure.
The second issue is how best to handle fiscal 
surpluses during periods of high prices. In recent 
years, there has been growing concern about how to 
use the fiscal surpluses generated by higher prices for 
non-renewables. As fiscal revenues rise and countries 
successfully stabilize fiscal expenditure in the face 
of short-term fluctuations in revenues from non-
renewables, countries must ask themselves how those 
surpluses should be used.
As table 6 shows, most of the resources going into 
the funds are preassigned. These precommitments or 
specific allocations may make the budgetary process 
more rigid. Although precommitments are not used 
in Chile, the funds that exist in Ecuador, Mexico 
and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela all have 
precommitments of some kind. In Ecuador, the entirety 
of the resources in the Special Account for Productive 
and Social Reactivation, Scientific and Technological 
Development and Fiscal Stabilization (CEREP), which 
replaced the Fund for Stabilization, Social Investment 
and Public Debt Reduction (FEIREP), are allocated as 
follows: 35% for credit lines, payment of debts owed 
to the Ecuadorian Social Security Institute, buyback 
of external debt and implementation of infrastructure 
projects; 30% for social investment projects; 5% for 
development-oriented scientific and technological 
research; 5% for improvements to the road network; 5% 
for environmental clean-up and social improvement; 
and the remaining 20% to stabilize oil revenues.
High levels of precommitment and successive rule 
changes have left the region’s funds with little capacity 
for accumulating resources. As table 7 shows, with the 
exception of Trinidad and Tobago, the impact on fiscal 
revenues of higher prices for non-renewables since 
2002 has not led to a corresponding increase in the 
balances of the region’s stabilization funds.21
To ensure the fiscal surpluses generated were 
used appropriately, both Chile and Mexico established 
mechanisms to regulate their use in 2006. In Chile, 
the Fiscal Responsibility Act was adopted to regulate 
the structural fiscal balance rule and the management 
of fiscal assets in excess of the expenditure level 
set by that rule. Two funds were created for this 
purpose: the Pensions Reserve Fund (FRP) and the 
Economic and Social Stabilization Fund (FEES). The 
former is designed to supplement the financing of 
fiscal obligations arising from the State minimum 
pensions guarantee and will be financed essentially by 
contributions from the fiscal surplus, capped at 0.5% 
of GDP. The latter will be financed by the Copper 
Compensation Fund (which it replaces) and with 
resources from fiscal surpluses exceeding 1% of GDP, 
minus contributions to the Pensions Reserve Fund 
(FRP). FEES resources will be used to finance social 
spending and public investment.
As for Mexico, in May 2006 the federal budget 
and financial responsibility law was adopted to regulate 
the use of fiscal surpluses and prevent these from 
being allocated to current expenditure. Compensation 
21 Rigobón (2006) summarizes the problems of this type of fund 
as follows: appropriability problems (i.e., the question of whether 
saved resources can be used or spent for purposes that lie outside 
the operating rules) and governance problems (i.e., the tendency for 
numerous funds to be created to achieve the same objective).
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funds have accordingly been set up to accumulate 
savings for use when oil prices fall. Initially, until 
these funds reach adequate reserve levels, surplus 
oil revenues will be allocated as follows: 25% to the 
Federal Agencies Revenue Stabilization Fund to be 
used for compensation purposes when actual receipts 
for revenue-sharing use are less than estimated in the 
budget; 25% to the Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) 
Stabilization Fund for Infrastructure Investment to 
offset declines in PEMEX’s own revenues; 40% to the 
Oil Revenues Stabilization Fund to offset lower federal 
government oil revenues; and 10% to the infrastructure 
investment projects of federal agencies. In a second 
phase, resources will be allocated as follows: 50% 
for infrastructure investment, 25% for investment in 
PEMEX and 25% for the pensions system.
Throughout this article, it has been stressed that 
countries specializing in non-renewables are far from 
being a uniform group. There are major differences 
between them in terms of the non-renewable product 
they have specialized in, the importance of that product 
for the economy, variations in its price, the size of 
reserves, the fiscal impact of its exploitation, the level 
of diversification in the tax structure, the composition 
of expenditure and the level of public debt, all of which 
are key criteria for designing an appropriate fiscal 
policy. When analysing these countries as a group, 
it is therefore vital not to lose sight of the specific 
characteristics of each case. Nonetheless, comparing 
the fiscal performance of this set of countries with that 
of the other countries in the region shows that they do 
have some distinctive features, especially in respect of 
the solvency and volatility of their public accounts.
TABLE 7
Latin America and the Caribbean (six countries): Year-end 
balances of stabilization funds, 1996-2005
(Percentages of gross domestic product)
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Chile 2.3 2.3 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.9 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.8
Colombia 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.6 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.4 1.2 1.6
Ecuador        0.3 0.4 1.1
Mexico     0.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2
Trinidad and Tobago     1.7 1.7 2.3 3.9 4.5 5.4
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of)    0.2 4.0 5.3 3.7 0.8 0.7 0.5
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official information. The 2005 figure for the Ecuadorian Fund is the balance at the time the fund was wound 
up (7 October 2005).
V
Some closing remarks
It should also be emphasized that, despite the 
region’s major efforts to diversify exports in recent 
years, a single product continues to account for 
a significant share of total exports in many Latin 
American countries. Combined with higher prices for 
energy and mineral products, this has resulted in a 
great improvement to the terms of trade of countries 
specializing in those commodities.
Thanks to their tax structures, which have been 
strengthened by the introduction of new revenue-raising 
instruments, and to the price patterns of recent years, 
these countries have been able to achieve a strong 
increase in fiscal receipts, which has meant their tax 
systems becoming even more focused on the sectors 
concerned. By contrast with previous periods, this 
increase in revenues has not led to a matching rise in 
expenditure. This has been due to non-expansionary 
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for fiscal surpluses, and both Chile and Mexico have 
introduced new instruments to regulate the management 
of public assets resulting from fiscal surpluses.
In summary, fiscal performance in the last few 
years suggests that there is scope for improving the 
fiscal initiatives adopted in recent times for stabilization 
purposes. As has been emphasized throughout this article, 
problems of solvency, volatility and the relationship 
with the economic cycle are not limited to countries 
whose exports are dominated by non-renewables, so 
the discussion about stabilizing fiscal policies cannot 
be confined to the group of countries analysed here. 
Nonetheless, the debate on the appropriate use of fiscal 
surpluses in countries specializing in finite resources 
should give greater prominence to considerations of 
intergenerational equity, so that a store of resources 
can be created for future generations.
(Original: Spanish)
fiscal decisions and the establishment of new fiscal 
institutions, enabling these countries to generate 
positive fiscal balances.
The region’s wealth of recent experience in 
designing and implementing different fiscal institutions, 
be they expenditure and public debt rules or stabilization 
funds, does not allow linear conclusions to be drawn. 
In the case of funds, it is not easy to carry out a 
conclusive evaluation, given that those of Mexico 
and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela are only 
four years old, and that the fund set up by Ecuador 
in 2002 lasted only three years. However, certain 
design characteristics, multiple precommitments and 
successive rule changes have meant that the balances 
accumulated in these funds are small, which raises 
doubts about their capacity to achieve their stated 
objectives.
In the countries concerned, this situation has 
intensified the debate about the most appropriate use 
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